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SITE-SPECIFIC  LAWS
John Copeland Nagle*
We are accustomed to thinking that Congress legislates equally through-
out the country.1  Assaulting a federal officer is illegal whether the attack
occurs in Virginia or in Colorado.2  The Endangered Species Act (ESA)3
applies equally to the Alabama red-bellied turtle, the Indiana bat, and the
California condor.4  Title VII of the Civil Rights Act prohibits the discrimina-
tory refusal to hire an African-American in Illinois and a Chinese-American
in Nevada.5
The exceptions tend to prove the rule.  The Cornhusker kickback was so
controversial because it would have extended additional Medicaid benefits
only to those living in Nebraska.  The Voting Rights Act’s preclearance provi-
sions are subject to continuing opposition because they impose more strin-
gent regulations on some states than others.  Congressional earmarks fell out
of favor because they funded projects in some places rather than others for
reasons unrelated to the value of the project.
But site-specific laws are much more common, less controversial, and
more justified than our intuition suggests.  The First Congress legislated for a
number of specific places, and such legislation has become much more com-
mon since then.  Statutes that target specific places are a common, if not
 2013 John Copeland Nagle.  Individuals and nonprofit institutions may reproduce
and distribute copies of this Article in any format at or below cost, for educational
purposes, so long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to the Notre Dame
Law Review, and includes this provision in the copyright notice.
* John N. Matthews Professor, Notre Dame Law School.  I am grateful to Sandi
Zellmer for providing thoughtful comments on an earlier draft of this Essay, and to
Elizabeth Pfenson for providing outstanding research assistance.
1 See, e.g., Nathaniel Persily, Drawing Lines in Shifting Sands: The DOJ, the VRA, and the
2011 Redistricting Process, 23 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 345, 345 (2012) (referring to “the gen-
eral rule of nationwide application of provisions in the U.S. Code”).
2 See 18 U.S.C. § 111 (2006).
3 16 U.S.C. § 1531 (2006).
4 See id. §§ 1531–1544.  Nearly one-third of the states are home to a namesake endan-
gered or threatened species. See 50 C.F.R. §§ 17.11–17.12 (2013) (listing endangered and
threatened wildlife and plants to include the Alabama beach mouse, Arizona cliff-rose,
California tiger salamander, Colorado hookless cactus, Florida panther, Hawaii akepa,
Northern Idaho ground squirrel, Kentucky cave shrimp, Louisiana black bear, Oregon
chub, Mississippi sandhill crane, Michigan monkey-flower, Missouri bladderpod, Tennes-
see yellow-eyed grass, Texas blind salamander, Utah prairie dog, Virginia sneezeweed, and
Wyoming toad).
5 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2006).
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inevitable, feature of federal lands management and the construction and
operation of federal facilities.
This Essay identifies the instances in which site-specific legislation is
appropriate.  It recounts the uses of such legislation, the theoretical debate
surrounding it, and the circumstances in which it is desirable.  I conclude
that site-specific legislation plays an important role in enabling Congress to
prescribe its preferred policy even when agreement on broader legislation
remains elusive.
I. TYPES OF SITE-SPECIFIC LAWS
Congress has been legislating about specific places since August 10,
1790, when it passed “An Act authorizing the Secretary of the Treasury to
finish the Lighthouse on Portland Head, in the District of Maine.”6  Site-
specific legislation enacted since then takes a variety of forms.  Congress may:
Name, build, or fund something at a particular place – Congress frequently
specifies the name that it wants affixed to a courthouse, post office, highway,
or other facility.7 Congress also enacts legislation directing the construction
of a lighthouse, courthouse, post office, road, bridge, hospital, or other pro-
ject at a certain place.  Most of these statutes are uncontroversial, though
there are also many instances of roads and bridges that generated intense
debate.  Some of the earlier battles in Congress involved the proposed con-
struction of canals, roads, and other “internal improvements” at the begin-
ning of the nineteenth century.  More recently, the construction of a nuclear
waste disposal facility at Yucca Mountain northwest of Las Vegas has pro-
duced conflicting legislation and proposed bills over the course of several
decades.8  Water projects are another source of repeated congressional legis-
lation and public debate.9  Finally, many provisions in appropriations statutes
direct the expenditure of federal funds at a particular place.10  While such
6 See Act of Aug. 10, 1790, ch. 41, 1 Stat. 184.
7 See, e.g., Pub. L. No. 112-184, 126 Stat. 1424 (2012) (designating the new United
States courthouse in Buffalo as the Robert H. Jackson United States Courthouse); Pub. L.
No. 112-161, 126 Stat. 1272 (2012) (naming a post office in Rome City, Indiana the SPC
Nicholas Scott Hartge Post Office).
8 See, e.g., Pub. L. No. 107-200, 116 Stat. 735 (2002) (approving the storage of nuclear
waste at Yucca Mountain in a joint resolution). See generally In re Aiken Cnty., 645 F.3d 428,
431–35 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (describing the history of plans to store nuclear wastes at Yucca
Mountain).
9 See Reed D. Benson, New Adventures of the Old Bureau: Modern-Day Reclamation Statutes
and Congress’s Unfinished Environmental Business, 48 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 137, 144 (2011)
(“Since the 2002 centennial of the reclamation program, Congress has authorized or
directed the Bureau [of Reclamation] to take dozens of site-specific actions.”).
10 See, e.g., Pub. L. No. 109-137, 119 Stat. 2646 (2005) (authorizing Clean Water Act
spending for Long Island Sound); Pub. L. No. 109-131, 119 Stat. 2566 (2005) (authorizing
educational funding for students attending schools located within Yosemite National
Park); Pub. L. No. 108-425, 118 Stat. 2420 (2004) (extending the authorization of funds to
clean up the Tijuana River Valley estuary and beach).
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provisions have a long heritage, in recent years they have been attacked as
improper earmarks.
Federal land management – Numerous federal statutes dictate special rules
for the acquisition, disposition, or management of particular pieces of feder-
ally owned lands.  For example, while Congress has enacted the Organic Act
and the Wilderness Act to govern the management of national parks and
wilderness areas respectively, Congress retains the sole authority to make the
threshold determination of which federal lands qualify as national parks and
wilderness areas.  Congress employed that authority to establish the Pinnacles
National Park in 2013 and to establish multiple new wilderness areas in
2009.11  Or Congress may create a new form of federal land management to
accommodate the unique needs of a particular place, as it did with respect to
the Valles Caldera in northern New Mexico and the Presidio in San Fran-
cisco.12  Congress also legislates specific land exchanges between private,
state, and federal owners.13
Create special regulatory authority for a specific place – There are numerous
instances in which Congress has established a new entity to regulate activities
at a specific place.  Congress has empowered regional fisheries councils to
manage eight distinct offshore fisheries from Maine to Alaska.14  Congress
has approved interstate compacts for the management of Lake Tahoe, the
Susquehanna River, the Delaware River, the Columbia River Gorge, and doz-
ens of other places.15  Alternatively, Congress has enacted statutes instructing
an agency to simply decide whether a specific project is in the public interest,
rather than relying on the agency’s application of generally applicable laws.
Congress recently employed that approach with respect to the proposed Key-
stone XL pipeline, the continued operation of an oyster farm within the
Point Reyes National Seashore, and the construction of a road through the
Izembek National Wildlife Refuge.
11 See Pinnacles National Park Act, Pub. L. No. 112-245, 126 Stat. 2385 (2012); Omni-
bus Public Land Management Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-11, 123 Stat. 991 (establishing
new wilderness areas).
12 See Sally K. Fairfax et al., Presidio and Valles Caldera: A Preliminary Assessment of Their
Meaning for Public Resource Management, 44 NAT. RESOURCES J. 445, 445–46 (2004).
13 See, e.g., Pub. L. No. 112-138, 126 Stat. 388 (2012) (authorizing the conveyance of
land to the town of Alta, Utah); Former Charleston Naval Base Land Exchange Act of
2012, Pub L. No. 112-146, 126 Stat. 1135; Lowell National Historical Park Land Exchange
Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-182, 126 Stat. 1420 (authorizing conveyance of land to and
establishment of Lowell National Historic Park); Blue Ridge Parkway and Town of Blowing
Rock Land Exchange Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-167, 124 Stat. 167 (authorizing convey-
ance of land for the Blue Ridge Parkway); Grand Teton National Park Land Exchange Act,
Pub. L. No. 108-32, 117 Stat. 779 (2003) (authorizing conveyance of Land for Grand Teton
National Park); Pub. L. No. 108-190, 117 Stat. 2867 (2003) (authorizing the exchange of
lands in the Coconino and Tonto National Forests in Arizona).
14 See JOSH EAGLE ET AL., TAKING STOCK OF THE REGIONAL FISHERIES MANAGEMENT
COUNCILS 4 (2003).
15 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-059, INTERSTATE COMPACTS: AN
OVERVIEW OF THE STRUCTURE AND GOVERNANCE OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES
COMPACTS 3 (2007).
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Give special regulatory treatment to a particular place – Less frequently, but
still with some regularity, Congress prescribes a special regulatory rule for a
particular place.  Most of these rules exempt a place from ordinary regula-
tion.  They include the exemption of activities within the Arctic Circle from
the Crude Oil Windfall Profit Tax Act of 198016 and the declaration that a
portion of the James River is not navigable for purpose of federal law.17
Occasionally, Congress enacts legislation that imposes more stringent regula-
tion on one place than occurs generally.  The preclearance provisions of the
Voting Rights Act are the most famous example of such an approach.18  Con-
gress also exempted states (like Nevada) with preexisting sports wagering
laws from a national ban on such wagering.19  And, Congress authorized Cali-
fornia to adopt more stringent air pollution regulations than otherwise
required by the Clean Air Act.20
II. THE THEORETICAL DEBATE CONCERNING SITE-SPECIFIC LAWS
A robust scholarly and policy debate addresses the supposed virtues and
vices of site-specific laws.  The scholarship favoring such legislation promotes
the use of “place-based management” instead of relying solely on general
legal commands.  Those who are concerned about site-specific laws recite a
number of constitutional, procedural, and policy flaws, especially with
respect to provisions enacted through the appropriations process.  My review
of these arguments suggests that the benefits of site-specific legislation can
often be secured without experiencing the dangers that such legislation can
present if employed improperly.
A. The Case for Site-Specific Laws
I first recognized the virtues of place-based management in my book
Law’s Environment, where I examined how the law interacts with other forces
to shape the natural environment in five places that I studied.21  One of the
surprising lessons of that research was the extent to which general laws often
produced quite unexpected consequences in each place.  By contrast, laws
aimed at particular places are more likely to achieve their intended goals.
That is just one of the virtues of site-specific legislation.  Besides being
responsive to local conditions, site-specific legislation takes advantage of con-
gressional expertise and offers a viable lawmaking outlet during times of
political polarization.
16 See United States v. Ptasynski, 462 U.S. 74, 79 (1983) (rejecting the argument that
the exemption violated that requirement of Article I, section 8, that taxes be “uniform
throughout the United States”).
17 See Pub. L. No. 106-32, 113 Stat 115 (1999).
18 See 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (2006).
19 See N.C.A.A. v. Christie, No. 12-4947, 2013 WL 772679, at *2–3 (D.N.J. 2013) (sum-
marizing the Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act, 28 U.S.C. § 3701 et seq.).
20 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7507, 7543 (2006).
21 JOHN COPELAND NAGLE, LAW’S ENVIRONMENT 8 (2010).
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1. Responsiveness to Local Conditions
The premise of place-based management is that unique places deserve
unique rules.  And every place is unique in some ways.  Laws that are tailored
to specific places are usually more responsive to local needs.  As Robert
Keiter explains, Congress uses place-based management “to meld national
and local interests into an acceptable and often locally brokered political
compromise.”22  Rob Fischman adds that “[t]he chief strength of this
approach is that it brings a wide range of stakeholders and regulatory juris-
dictions, state and federal, together to engage in holistic management.”23
Such laws often result from a collaborative process that emphasizes com-
promise among stakeholders.  Or Congress could empower an agency to
authorize experimental projects, rather than enacting multiple separate
place-based statutes or an overall change in an agency’s governing statutory
commands.  And even when compromise remains elusive, place-based law-
making at least provides a resolution.  It enables contested issues to “be dealt
with squarely in legislation, rather than pushing them into alternative forums
of conflict resolution, like interminable planning or rulemaking processes.”24
2. Congressional Expertise
Site-specific legislation presumes that there are management and regula-
tory decisions that are better made by Congress than by administrative agen-
cies implementing general laws.  The relative advantages of legislation and
agency rulemaking, of course, have long been debated and have generated
substantial literature.  My premise here is that there are at least some
instances in which Congress is better suited to adopt the rule governing a
particular place.  That is especially likely to be true when the resolution of an
issue depends on the weighing of conflicting values rather than scientific
judgment.  For example, Senator Barbara Boxer has defended the congres-
sional determination of which water projects to authorize because she
“trust[s] the senators and members of Congress who know the ground on
which they live to make these decisions.”25
Place-based management that results from site-specific legislation may
also be a superior alternative to relying on an administrative agency to imple-
ment a broad statutory command.  The Forest Service, for example, is
charged with managing national forests to accommodate “multiple uses.”26
But, as Martin Nie and Michael Fiebig explain, “there is a tremendous
amount of political and legal conflict over national forest management,”
22 ROBERT B. KEITER, KEEPING FAITH WITH NATURE 302 (2003).
23 Robert L. Fischman, Cooperative Federalism and Natural Resources Law, 14 N.Y.U.
ENVTL. L.J. 179, 196 (2005).
24 Martin Nie & Michael Fiebig, Managing the National Forests Through Place-Based Legis-
lation, 37 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 32 (2010).
25 Nathan Hurst, Keeping the Water Bill Afloat Without Earmarks, CQ WEEKLY (Oct. 22,
2012) (quoting Sen. Boxer) (internal quotation marks omitted).
26 See Multiple-Use Sustained-Yield Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 528–531 (2006).
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which is often characterized by “appeals and litigation with challengers from
all sides of the political spectrum.”27  They add that “[t]he agency’s broad
statutory mandate helps explain why administrative rulemakings and forest
planning processes are the dominant ways in which political choices have
been made in the past.”28  National forests are more vulnerable to shifting
agency choices as administrations change because the legislation establishing
specific national parks often contains specific commands regarding their
management.  Site-specific legislation avoids such regulatory swings by codify-
ing a congressional decision about how a particular place is to be managed.
3. Legislating Amidst Political Polarization
Additionally, site-specific legislation has become especially valuable dur-
ing a period of congressional gridlock.  The 112th Congress enacted nearly
300 statutes.  It just couldn’t pass the big ones.  The United States Parole
Commission Extension Act of 2011, the Combating Autism Reauthorization
Act of 2011, and the Ski Area Recreational Opportunity Enhancement Act of
2011 all became law.  The DREAM Act and the Repealing the Job-Killing
Health Care Law Act did not.  Many of the statutes enacted by the 112th
Congress applied only to specific places.  It is often easier to gain a consensus
within a polarized Congress on more modest legislation than more ambitious
legislation.  Such strategic considerations provide a further justification for
site-specific legislation, especially when the alternative is no new legislation at
all.
B. The Concerns About Site-Specific Laws
Site-specific laws generate several types of concerns.  According to its
detractors, legislation that governs on a particular place is constitutionally
suspect, contrary to the value of uniformity, prone to capture by special inter-
ests, tainted by flawed procedures, and precedent for undesirable future laws.
Each of these concerns contains some validity but is exaggerated, as I discuss
in this section.
1. Constitutional Objections
The U.S. Constitution contains numerous provisions that could seem to
discourage the enactment of laws treating one place differently than another.
Article I requires that bankruptcy, immigration, and tax laws be uniform
throughout the United States.29  Article I also empowers Congress to tax and
spend for the “general Welfare of the United States.”30  The restriction to
27 See Nie & Fiebig, supra note 24, at 4.
28 Id.
29 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 (providing that “all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall
be uniform throughout the United States”); id. art. I, § 8, cl. 4 (empowering Congress to
establish “uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States”); id.
(giving Congress the power to “establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization”).
30 Id. art. 1, § 8, cl. 1.
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spending on the “general” welfare generated substantial debate during the
early nineteenth century, when legislators and Presidents reached different
conclusions about the constitutionality of internal improvements, typically
roads and canals, that would exclusively benefit one state.31  The Fourteenth
Amendment guarantees all persons “the equal protection of the laws,”32
which could be understood to require that the law treat people the same way
regardless of where they are.  The Supreme Court has held that states enter
the Union on an “equal footing” with existing states, and the resulting equal
footing doctrine guarantees each state the right to their navigable waters and
land beneath them.33
These provisions do not stand in the way of statutes that treat one place
differently from another.  The Equal Protection Clause, for example, “relates
to equality between persons as such rather than between areas.”34  The
Supreme Court relied on that distinction in upholding both a Maryland stat-
ute that allowed evidence of gambling in some counties but not others35 and
another Maryland statute that contained “a myriad of exceptions for various
counties, district of counties, cities and towns” from the State’s general Sun-
day closing laws.36  Congress, too, has established special rules and funded
projects for discrete places without the courts identifying any constitutional
defect.  Even the Cornhusker Kickback, which would have provided more
generous Medicaid funding for Nebraska than other states, was primarily
assailed as unwise rather than unconstitutional.37
The most controversial statutory treatment of some places worse than
others occurs in the preclearance provisions of the Voting Rights Act
(VRA).38  Congress required jurisdictions that demonstrated a history of vot-
ing discrimination (as determined by a specific formula) to obtain the
preclearance of the Justice Department or a federal district court before
changing their voting rules.39  Jurisdictions without such a history were sub-
ject to the VRA’s prohibitions on discrimination, but they were not subject to
the preclearance requirement.40  The Supreme Court upheld that differen-
31 See JOHN LAURITZ LARSON, INTERNAL IMPROVEMENT 71–107 (2001); John C. Eastman,
Restoring the “General” to the General Welfare Clause, 4 CHAP. L. REV. 63, 82 (2001).
32 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
33 See PPL Montana, LLC v. Montana, 132 S. Ct. 1215, 1227 (2012); see also N.C.A.A. v.
Christie, No. 12-4947, 2013 WL 772679, at *5–23 (D.N.J. 2012) (rejecting an equal footing
challenge to the Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act, as well Tenth Amend-
ment, Commerce Clause, and Equal Protection Clause arguments).
34 Salsburg v. Maryland, 346 U.S. 545, 551 (1954).
35 See id. at 546.
36 McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 424 (1960).
37 See John Dinan, Shaping Health Reform: State Government Influence in the Patient Protec-
tion and Affordable Care Act, 41 J. FEDERALISM 395 (2011) (describing the Cornhusker Kick-
back and the objections to it, and suggesting that the occasional claims of
unconstitutionality sought to persuade the public, not the courts).
38 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2006).
39 Id. § 1973c.
40 Id. § 1973b(a)(1).
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tial treatment in 1966,41 but the Court is now considering whether such an
approach is still justified.42
2. Lack of Uniformity
Different laws for different places are the opposite of regulating uni-
formly.  Uniformity is often touted as a virtue of environmental laws.  Uni-
formity is in fact virtuous when like places are treated alike.  But many places
are different from one another in important ways.
The uniformity of many environmental laws, moreover, is a myth.  The
CAA’s National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) are perhaps the
most famous example of a uniform environmental regulation.  The EPA
must establish the NAAQS on a uniform, nationwide basis in order to ensure
that no one’s health will be threatened by exposure to six common air pollu-
tants.43  But actual air quality diverges considerably throughout the country
more than four decades after Congress introduced the NAAQS, thanks in
part to other provisions of the CAA.  Those places where the air was already
far cleaner than the NAAQS required—think of Santa Fe, which had the
nation’s cleanest air in 2012—are subject to more stringent regulation under
the CAA’s aptly-titled Prevention of Significant Deterioration program.44
Those places where the air remains more polluted than the NAAQS permit
are subject to the CAA’s nonattainment provisions,45 which have yet to
demonstrate that they will actually result in the attainment of the NAAQS
despite their name.  So while the CAA does not intend to establish different
pollution levels for different places, the actual implementation of the CAA
produces that result.
3. Capture, Legislative Procedure, and the Appropriations Process
Congressional resolution of policy disputes on a case-by-case basis raises
concerns about which interests are best equipped to influence the legislative
process.  For example, Rob Fischman observes that “[e]nvironmental groups
simply do not have the resources to participate in every site-specific debate
over development, clean-up, or restoration.  Short-staffed organizations do
better leveraging their resources through rulemakings establishing nationally
applicable substantive standards.”46  The concern about capture is magnified
in a type of site-specific environmental lawmaking that has received a hostile
41 See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 308 (1966).
42 See Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 594, 594 (2012) (granting certiorari to decide
“[w]hether Congress’ decision in 2006 to reauthorize Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act
under the pre-existing coverage formula of Section 4(b) of the Voting Rights Act exceeded
its authority under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments and thus violated the Tenth
Amendment and Article IV of the United States Constitution”).
43 See 42 U.S.C. § 7408(a) (2006).
44 See Alaska Dep’t of Envtl. Conservation v. EPA, 540 U.S. 461, 470–72 (2004).
45 For details on Nonattainment Area requirements, see 42 U.S.C. §§ 7501–7515.
46 Robert L. Fischman, The Divides of Environmental Law and the Problem of Harm in the
Endangered Species Act, 83 IND. L.J. 661, 670 (2008).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\88-5\NDL506.txt unknown Seq: 9 19-JUN-13 11:44
2013] site-specific  laws 2175
response among environmental scholars.  Unable to enact sweeping new
environmental legislation through its normal channels, Congress often
resorts to adding substantive changes to environmental law in appropriations
bills.  Such use of the congressional appropriations process began almost
immediately after Congress enacted the landmark environmental legislation
of the 1970s.  Congress exempted the Tellico Dam from the strictures of the
ESA pursuant to an appropriations rider attached to a funding bill that Presi-
dent Carter reluctantly signed because he favored the water projects that
were also contained in the bill.47  By 2012, members of Congress proposed
appropriations riders that would have:
• Blocked the reintroduction of Chinook salmon into the San Joaquin
River;
• Forbidden the National Parks Service from enforcing boating regulations
in the Yukon-Charley National Preserve in Alaska;
• Barred EPA enforcement of Florida’s water quality standards;
• Prohibited the Secretary of the Interior withdrawing land north of the
Grand Canyon from new uranium mining claims (as discussed in the pre-
vious section);
• Authorized federal funds to be for land acquisition without congressional
approval only when assisting the restoration of the Everglades; and
• Prevented the government from shutting down the proposed nuclear
waste repository at Yucca Mountain in Nevada.48
The Northwest Forest Plan provides a familiar illustration of the debate
regarding the use of appropriations riders to establish environmental law.  As
described by Sandi Zellmer, Congress used its appropriations process “to
overturn decades of environmental policy and compromise relating to log-
ging in sensitive old growth forests of the Pacific Northwest.”49  Management
of forested land in Oregon and Washington had buffeted between the gen-
eral multiple-use commands respecting national forests and the restrictions
imposed by environmental legislation such as NEPA and the ESA (thanks to
the listing of the northern spotted owl in 1990).50  During the 1980s and
early 1990s, Oregon Senator Mark Hatfield used his position as chair or rank-
ing member of the Appropriations Committee to insert a series of riders
requiring continued timber production contrary to the plan.51  One of those
riders—“popularly known as the Northwest Timber Compromise,” according
to the Supreme Court—“both required harvesting and expanded harvesting
restrictions” in “‘the thirteen national forests in Oregon and Washington and
[BLM] districts in western Oregon known to contain northern spotted
47 See JOHN COPELAND NAGLE ET AL., THE LAW OF BIODIVERSITY AND ECOSYSTEM MANAGE-
MENT 241–43 (3d ed. 2013) (describing the Tellico Dam saga).
48 See DEFENDERS OF WILDLIFE, ANTI-ENVIRONMENTAL RIDERS ON FY 2012 APPROPRIA-
TIONS BILLS AS OF 12/23/2011 (FINAL), 5, 7, 17, 19, available at http://www.defenders.org/
publications/fy2012-anti-environmental-riders-list-12-23-11.pdf.
49 Sandra Beth Zellmer, Sacrificing Legislative Integrity at the Altar Of Appropriations Rid-
ers: A Constitutional Crisis, 21 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 457, 465–66 (1997).
50 Id. at 467–68.
51 Id. at 468–69.
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owls.’”52  The Clinton Administration sought to resolve the controversy once
it took office by negotiating the Northwest Forest Plan with a large group of
stakeholders.  But the plan failed to satisfy the region’s congressional delega-
tion, prompting Congress to intervene once again by adding an “emergency
timber salvage rider” to the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations for
Additional Disaster Assistance, for Anti-Terrorism Initiatives, for Assistance in
the Recovery from the Tragedy that Occurred at Oklahoma City, and Rescis-
sions Act.53  The courts upheld the riders,54 but the riders embittered envi-
ronmentalists who had been laboring to apply NEPA, the ESA, and other
statutes to the management of old growth trees standing on national forest
lands.
The procedural objections to the enactment of substantive environmen-
tal law provisions via the appropriations process are a bit curious.  The consti-
tutional requirements of bicameralism (approval by the House and the
Senate) and presentment (approval by the President or overriding his veto)
impose stringent limits on the enactment of federal statutes.  Many believe
that those limits are too stringent, at least when combined with internal rules
such as the Senate’s filibuster.  But the provisions of an appropriations bill,
like any other statutory provisions, become law only if they survive that legis-
lative gauntlet.  What, exactly, is the problem with using the appropriations
process to legislate?  Environmental activists and legal scholars have cited the
lack of congressional deliberation, the bundling of unrelated provisions, and
substantive bad outcomes.  These are all valid concerns, but they do not jus-
tify singling out provisions enacted via the appropriations process for special
condemnation.
If the problem is a lack of deliberation, then faulting the appropriations
process is an imperfect proxy.  “Congress,” writes Richard Lazarus, “has dis-
played no ability to engage in the deliberate policymaking essential to
thoughtful resolution of the difficult economic, social, and moral issues
raised by environmental lawmaking.”55  Lazarus was referring to the use of
appropriations to make environmental law, but deliberate policymaking is
not always a feature of legislation enacted according to the regular process.
Consider the Omnibus Public Land Management Act of 2009, which I noted
above.56  Environmentalists praised the law for protecting millions of acres of
lands, but it was not a model of deliberative democracy.  When the bill was
debated in Congress, its opponents complained that “[n]one of the several
committees with jurisdiction over this bill had any hearing on the troubling
52 Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Soc’y, 503 U.S. 429, 433 (1992) (quoting Department
of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 101-121, § 318(i),
103 Stat. 745 (1990)).
53 Pub L. No. 104-15, § 2001, 109 Stat. 194, 240–47 (1995).
54 See Mahler v. U.S. Forest Serv., 128 F.3d 573, 575 (7th Cir. 1997).
55 Richard J. Lazarus, Congressional Descent: The Demise of Deliberative Democracy in Envi-
ronmental Law, 94 GEO. L.J. 619, 632–33 (2006).
56 Pub. L. No. 111-11, 123 Stat. 991 (2009) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 7, 16, 33, 36, 42, and 43 U.S.C.A. (West 2010)).
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provisions within this bill,”57 and there had not been any hearings on 100 of
the bill’s 170 provisions.58  They also complained that “[t]his package is
largely a product of closed-door deal-making.”59  But what if Congress actu-
ally deliberated on—and held hearings on—the provision to displace the
Northwest Forest Plan?  Or what if Congress was familiar with the Plan and
simply relied on the existing administrative record to make its decision?
Could, for example, a member of Congress simply propose a rider to over-
turn the Plan by saying “I’ve read the EIS and the administrative debate, and
I’m convinced that the opponents have the better argument”?  The concern
about a lack of deliberation discounts the increased attention that appropria-
tions riders receive when they propose to change the environmental law gov-
erning a certain place.  The specter of Congress approving the Tellico Dam
exemption during the middle of the night has been replaced by e-mail alerts
listing any controversial riders that Congress may consider.
If the problem is bundling unrelated provisions, then that is not unique
to the appropriations process either.  Consider the Omnibus Public Lands
Management Act of 200960 again.  It included lots of expanded wilderness
areas, new national park units, and other expanded environmental protec-
tions.61  Was it improper for Congress to bundle them all together instead of
voting for them individually?  Some members of Congress objected on that
basis, saying that they liked most of the provisions but not others.  The bill’s
opponents complained that the bill was “largely a product of closed-door
deal-making,” and that it was “designed to ensure that just enough congres-
sional districts receive something to induce support for very controversial
measures that underwent no public hearing.”62
If the problem is the likely substantive outcome, then it is not clear that
Congress is more likely to enact bad policies through the appropriations pro-
cess instead of good ones.  What really matters is who is in control of the
presidency and Congress.  The most recent proposed appropriations riders
would restrict administrative efforts to expand environmental protections.63
That anti-environmental focus is a function of the current distribution of
power—a Democratic President and a Republican House of Representa-
tive—more than any inherent qualities of riders themselves.  But when the
tables were turned and George W. Bush was President and Congress was in
Democratic control, members of Congress proposed appropriations riders to
expand environmental protections in the face of contrary administrative
decisions.  In 2005, a bipartisan coalition of environmentalists and fiscal con-
servatives unsuccessfully tried to attach an appropriations rider that would
have limited road building in southeastern Alaska’s Tongass National For-
57 155 CONG. REC. 8725 (2009) (statement of Rep. Hastings).
58 Id. at 8729 (statement of Rep. Gohmert).
59 Id. at 8724 (statement of Rep. Hastings).
60 123 Stat. at 991.
61 Id.
62 155 CONG. REC. 8724 (2009) (statement of Rep. Hastings).
63 See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
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est.64  In 2007, Democratic members of Congress proposed an appropria-
tions rider that would have blocked the BLM from authorizing oil leasing on
western Colorado’s Roan Plateau.65
4. Precedential Value
Statutes don’t have a stare decisis effect on future legislatures.  Unlike
courts, legislators are under no obligation to defer to the judgment of their
predecessors (or their own prior opinions) regarding the desirability of pro-
posed legislation.  Each legislature—and each legislator—builds on the body
of law that preceded them, but they do so without the same obligation to
precedent that constrains judges and courts.66
Yet site-specific legislation has been opposed simply because it could
establish a precedent for other places.  If one place receives its desired treat-
ment, should another place receive the same treatment, too?  In theory, simi-
lar treatment should only be extended to similar places.  In practice, the
representatives of each place will seek the most favorable treatment, however
they define such treatment.  Environmental groups have been especially con-
cerned about place-based provisions that could be cited in future debates
about national environmental policy.
Precedent has played a central role in a recent controversy regarding the
continued operation of an oyster farm within the Point Reyes National Sea-
shore.  Congress established the national seashore in 1962, and then in 1976
it designated over 25,000 acres as wilderness and another 8,000 as “potential
wilderness.”67  Drake’s Estero, the site of oyster farming since the 1930s, was
within the potential wilderness.  The oyster farm’s lease to operate within the
national seashore was due to expire in November 2012, but in 2009 Congress
enacted an appropriations rider that authorized (but did not require) the
Secretary of the Interior to extend the lease for another ten years.68  The
64 See Dan Berman, Tongass Amendment Fails Prior to Passage of Interior Spending Bill,
ENV’T & ENERGY DAILY, June 30, 2005.
65 See Dan Berman, Colorado Dems Seek Rider to Block Roan Plateau Leasing, GREENWIRE
(May 15, 2007), http://rlch.org/news/colorado-dems-seek-rider-block-roan-plateau-
leasing.
66 The precise obligation imposed by stare decisis, of course, is itself contested. See
generally Amy Coney Barrett, Stare Decisis and Due Process, 74 U. COLO. L. REV. 1011 (2003)
(exploring the Due Process Clause as a limitation on stare decisis); Michael Stokes Paulsen,
The Intrinsically Corrupting Influence of Precedent, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 289 (2005) (criticizing
the tension inherent in adhering to stare decisis in connection with one’s broader theory
of constitutional interpretation); Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REV. 571 (1987)
(using an abstract, extra-legal analysis of precedent to gain insight into the role of prece-
dent in the law).  For a rare discussion of the effect of precedent on Congress, see gener-
ally Mark Tushnet, Legislative and Executive Stare Decisis, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1339
(2008).
67 See Drakes Bay Oyster Co. v. Salazar, No. 12-CV-06134-YGR, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
15056, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 4, 2013).
68 See Department of the Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies Appropriations
Act, 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-88, § 124, 123 Stat. 2904, 2932 (2009).
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provision did not identify the criteria that the Secretary should apply in
deciding whether or not to extend the lease, save for directing the Secretary
to “take into consideration [the] recommendations of the National Academy
of Sciences.”69  The provision also emphasized that it should not “be cited as
precedent for management of any potential wilderness outside the
Seashore.”70
Nonetheless, Secretary of the Interior Kenneth Salazar declined to
extend the lease because of “the incompatibility of commercial activities in
[a] wilderness.”71  Salazar also noted that the provision authorizing him to
extend the lease “in no way overrides the intent of Congress as expressed in
the 1976 act to establish wilderness at the estero.”72  That claim is hard to
reconcile with the 2009 provision’s implicit determination that the relative
value of the oyster farm and the potential wilderness was for the Secretary to
decide.  Salazar’s view, however, implicitly endorses the numerous commen-
tators who feared that extending the lease would establish an unwanted pre-
cedent to permit commercial activities within other wilderness areas.73  This
fear seems unfounded, for two opposite reasons.  On the one hand, Congress
has never acted as if it was bound by its previous decisions, so approving one
exemption is unlikely to influence members considering a future exemption
request.  On the other hand, pressure for exemptions will continue even if
this exemption request is denied.  Congress has demonstrated that it is capa-
ble of judging proposed site-specific legislation on its merits.
III. A MODEL FOR SITE-SPECIFIC LAWS
Statutes disrupt the status quo, which allows activities notwithstanding
their effects on a place except in the rare instances in which the activity quali-
69 Id.
70 Id.
71 Memorandum from Secretary Ken Salazar to Director, National Park Service, Nov.
29, 2012, at 5 n.5, available at http://www.doi.gov/news/pressreleases/loader.cfm?
csModule=security/getfile&pageid=332286.
72 Id. at 6.
73 See Nell Green Nylen et al., Will the Wilderness Act Be Diluted in Drakes Estero?, 39
ECOLOGY L. CURRENTS 46, 64 (2012) (insisting that the statutory provision denying prece-
dential effect is “a false promise” because other members of Congress would be able to
seek their own exemptions); Robert Gammon, The Real Reasons for Ken Salazar’s Decision,
EAST BAY EXPRESS (Dec. 5, 2012), http://www.eastbayexpress.com/oakland/the-real-rea-
sons-for-ken-salazars-decision/Content?oid=3405939 (“Salazar essentially decided that it
would be a mistake to set a national precedent, and thus open the door for other commer-
cial enterprises on potential wilderness land around the country to request lease exten-
sions, too.”); Susan Ives, Point Reyes National Seashore, Embattled at 50, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS
(Nov. 23, 2012) (“Many legal experts believe it could lead to a precedent affecting not only
wilderness at Point Reyes but also the law on National Wilderness Preservation.”); Jason
Mark, In Defense of Drakes Bay Oyster Company, EARTH ISLAND J. (Dec. 18, 2012) (quoting a
local environmental activist as saying: “[W]hether it’s oil or oysters, it’s the same precedent
that could be applicable.  That if you have friends in high places, you can get special
treatment.”).
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fies as a nuisance or runs afoul of another common law doctrine.  Our lead-
ing environmental statutes regulate activities that cause environmental harm
regardless of where it occurs.  They do so by inviting site-specific decisions,
but by administrative agencies rather than Congress.  The EPA decides
whether to approve a state’s implementation plan under the Clean Air Act74
and when a hazardous waste cleanup is sufficient under the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA).75
The Fish and Wildlife Service identifies the critical habitat of endangered
species and develops unique recovery plans for each species listed under the
Endangered Species Act.76  In these and other statutes, Congress has legis-
lated the general requirements and entrusted federal agencies to implement
them at specific places.
Site-specific legislation returns those decisions to Congress.  It operates
as an exception to the exception.  Activities affecting certain places are per-
missible except when a general law governs that place or those effects, and
that general law applies except when Congress decides to resolve the matter
itself.  Congress always retains the authority to enact such site-specific rules,
but as the concerns analyzed in the previous section indicate, it is not always
desirable for Congress to take such action.
My suggestion, therefore, is that general legislation should remain the
default for congressional action, but site-specific legislation is appropriate
when (a) there are convincing reasons for adopting special rules for a partic-
ular place, (b) there is no agreement for the establishment of a new general
rule, and (c) the legislation is enacted through transparent procedures.
These criteria are meant as guidelines, not as a rigid formula.
To elaborate, the reasons for adopting special rules for a particular place
can include its history, its environmental conditions, and its economic needs.
There is no fixed way to identify these needs or to weigh them against the
benefits of retaining a general rule.  Mere power to effect a special status for
a particular place is insufficient.  Actions that are intended to benefit a
favored constituent, donor, or colleague are the most obvious examples of
improper reasons for providing special legislative treatment.  But, distin-
guishing legitimate reasons from arbitrary advantage is likely to be difficult.
The second factor supporting site-specific legislation is a lack of consen-
sus for a new general rule.  Dissatisfaction with a general law may not result
in its replacement if Congress does not agree on the contents of a new law or
if affected parties believe that a new law would actually be worse than the
existing general law.  It is easier for Congress to agree on a site-specific law
that treats a certain place differently than it is for Congress to agree on a new
general law that will treat all places the same.  Or Congress may be satisfied
with the general rule, while objecting to a federal agency’s application of the
rule to a particular place.
74 42 U.S.C. § 7410 (2006).
75 42 U.S.C. § 9628 (2006).
76 16 U.S.C. § 1533 (2006).
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The third factor is transparency.  Ideally, a site-specific law—indeed, any
statute—should result from a thorough vetting by the ordinary congressional
deliberative process.  Committee hearings, opportunity for floor debate and
amendment, and adequate notice to legislators and the public all enhance
the pedigree of a congressional decision to adopt a special rule for a specific
place.
Consider the following three examples of the application of this
approach to site-specific legislation:
A. Building a Bridge Across the St. Croix River
The St. Croix River Crossing Project Authorization Act shows how Con-
gress legislates a special environmental rule for a particular place.77  The St.
Croix River flows for 169 miles from northern Wisconsin into the Mississippi
River, forming the border between Wisconsin and Minnesota for nearly three
quarters of its length.  The river “was one of Minnesota’s most important
industrial rivers” during the nineteenth century, but it returned to a more
wild condition as logging ended.78  A 1959 Park Service survey reported that
the river valley was “pleasant, but not spectacular.”79  In 1972, Congress des-
ignated part of the St. Croix pursuant to the Wild & Scenic Rivers Act of
1968, citing the river’s scenic qualities and recreational opportunities.  The
river bluffs, islands, vegetation, wildlife, and historic river towns all contribute
to the river’s scenic qualities.  The Park Service is charged with managing the
river to protect and enhance the values that caused it to be designated.
Much of the land along the river remains in private ownership, although
there are several state parks along both sides of the river, so the Park Ser-
vice’s land management responsibilities are modest.  Of greater importance,
section 7(a) of the Wild & Scenic Rivers Act (WSRA) prohibits the Park Ser-
vice from approving any “project that would have a direct and adverse effect
on the values for which [the] river was established.”80
The controversy that resulted in the St. Croix River Act concerns the
proposed construction of a new bridge across the river between Stillwater,
Minnesota and Houghton, Wisconsin.  The current lift bridge, built in 1931,
had been regarded as outmoded for several decades, thus prompting a series
of proposals to build a new bridge.  A series of alternative bridge designs
77 Like many other site-specific statutes, the St. Croix River Crossing Project Authoriza-
tion Act does not admit to the kind of obvious acronym that characterizes much of envi-
ronmental law, but the absence of such acronyms may be a virtue rather than a vice. See
Pac. Rivers Council v. U.S. Forest Serv., 689 F.3d 1012, 1019 (9th Cir. 2012) (chastising the
Forest Service for misstating the meaning of an acronym); Nat’l Ass’n of Regulatory Util.
Comm’rs v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, 680 F.3d 819, 820 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (reminding par-
ties in a nuclear waste case to limit the use of acronyms); Lawrence Hurley, Judge Tells
Agency Lawyers to Kill the Acronyms ASAP, GREENWIRE (Nov. 20, 2012), http://eenews.net/
public/Greenwire/2012/11/20/1.
78 THEODORE J. KARAMANSKI, SAVING THE SAINT CROIX 1 (1993).
79 Id. at 42 (quoting a memo from Evan H. Haynes of the Recreation Surveys Branch).
80 16 U.S.C. § 1278(a) (2006).
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navigated local community debate, administrative review by the Park Service,
and federal court litigation between 1995 and 2010.  The NPS struggled to
review the proposed St. Croix bridge according to the dictates of the WSRA.
Initially, the Park Service found that a new bridge would comply with section
7(a) of the WSRA, but a federal court overturned that conclusion as arbitrary
and capricious in 2010.81  The Park Service tried again, and this time it found
that the proposed bridge “would have a direct and adverse effect on the rec-
reational values for which the Riverway was established” because “of the una-
voidable visual intrusion the proposed bridge would impose upon the scenic
character of the Riverway and the inherent link between the scenic character
and recreational enjoyment of the Riverway.”82
The NPS decision meant that only Congress could authorize the bridge
by exempting it from the provisions of the WSRA.  That is exactly what hap-
pened.  Stillwater’s congressional representative—Michelle Bachmann—
responded to the Park Service’s decision by proposing legislation to author-
ize the bridge notwithstanding the Wild & Scenic Rivers Act.  The legislative
solution quickly gained bipartisan support in both Minnesota and Wisconsin,
though it also generated some opposition.  The Senate approved the bill in
January 2012, and then the House approved it on a 339-80 vote.  President
Obama signed the bill without comment.
The Act illustrates how Congress can properly legislate with respect to a
particular place.  The process of enacting the bill was extremely transparent.
Numerous entities studied various bridge proposals, including an environ-
mental impact statement (EIS) prepared by the Federal Highway Administra-
tion in 1995 and supplemented thereafter, as well as the Park Service’s
multiple WSR reviews.83  The studies considered alternate bridge locations
and designs as well as other ways of resolving the problem, even tunneling
under the river.  The Udall Institute conducted an environmental remedia-
tion process with a group of stakeholders who tried to resolve the dispute,
ultimately gaining the support of all interested parties except for the Sierra
Club and a local Friends of the St. Croix group.84  The Senate Energy &
Natural Resources Committee held a hearing in July 2011 that considered
81 See Sierra Club North Star Chapter v. LaHood, 693 F. Supp. 2d 958, 962 (D. Minn.
2010).
82 NATIONAL PARK SERVICE, EVALUATION AND DETERMINATION SECTION 7(A) OF THE
WILD AND SCENIC RIVERS ACT ST. CROIX RIVER CROSSING PROJECT, at x (2010), available at
http://www.dot.state.mn.us/metro/projects/stcroix/pdfs/sierra/Stillw_sec7(a)Final_10.
15.10appends.pdf.
83 See St. Croix River Crossing Project, Minnesota, USDOT FHA http://environment.
fhwa.dot.gov/projdev/travel_landUse/st-croix-case-study/st-croix-case-study.htm (summa-
rizing FHAs various impact statements and other studies).
84 See JOHN G. WOFFORD & DALE L. KEYES, U.S. INST. FOR ENVTL. CONFLICT RESOLUTION,
ONE RIVER, TWO BRIDGES (2001) (assessing and attempting to resolve the various
proposals).
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testimony from the bill’s supporters and its opponents.85  The bill earned
bipartisan support from an eclectic group of politicians: Senator Klobuchar
and Representative Bachmann, Wisconsin’s Republican Governor Scott
Walker (who had just survived a recall effort initiated by workers opposed to
his public employment reforms) and Tammy Baldwin, a Democratic House
member from Wisconsin who became the first lesbian elected to the U.S.
Senate later in 2012.86  The bridge’s supporters repeatedly referred to the
decades that had passed while trying to approve a new bridge, and they
blamed federal bureaucrats, environmental activists, or the Wild & Scenic
Rivers Act for preventing a common sense solution.  And they asserted that
only Congress could fix the problem.87
Two other Minnesota representatives raised the only procedural objec-
tions to the bill.  Betsy McCollum insisted that the bill qualified as an
earmark because “it designates a specific project in a specific location.”88
Technically, the bill was not an earmark within House rules.  More impor-
tantly, no one else echoed McCollum’s broader point that Congress should
not legislate for “a specific project in a specific location.”  Keith Ellison
objected to the House’s consideration of the bill under the suspension of
rules, which “is for things that are supposed to be uncontroversial” and which
limits debate and precludes any amendments.89  The fact that a two-thirds
majority is required to approve any bills under the suspension calendar guar-
antees that only bills with broad, bipartisan support will be considered in that
way.
The consensus need for a new bridge provided the primary justification
for the Act.  Even the proposed bridge’s opponents acknowledged that the
existing bridge was inadequate.  The existing bridge was blamed for con-
gested traffic and feared as a threat to public safety.  Senator Klobuchar
reported that “[c]hunks of rusting steel and concrete fall off and into the
river below,” an image that would be especially haunting to Minnesotans
after the deadly collapse of the I-35 bridge in Minneapolis in 2007.90  The
construction of a new bridge would also generate new jobs.  At the same
time, the supporters of the bridge emphasized that the project was designed
to minimize its environmental impact, and they downplayed the scenic quali-
ties of the bridge’s proposed location.  The mayor of Stillwater testified that
the bridge would be built “within the industrial part of the river, next to a
power plant, a sewage plant, and a marina.”91





88 158 CONG. REC. H1081 (daily ed. Feb. 29, 2012) (statement of Rep. McCollum).
89 Id. at H1085 (statement of Rep. Ellison).
90 Id. at S1180 (daily ed. Mar. 1, 2012) (statement of Sen. Klobuchar).
91 Miscellaneous National Parks Bills: Hearing on S. 888 Before the Subcomm. on Nat’l Parks of
the S. Comm. on Energy & Natural Resources, 112th Cong. 36 (2011) (statement of Ken
Harycki, Mayor, City of Stillwater, MN).
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The bridge was resisted by a handful of local politicians, several leading
environmental organizations, and anti-tax groups.  The opponents of the
bridge cited its cost, the relatively few people who would be served by a new
bridge, the fact that spending the money on this one bridge would make it
more difficult to pay for many other needed bridge repairs, and the fact that
another bridge crossed the St. Croix River along I-94 just six miles away.
They said little about the bridge’s impact on the scenic qualities that the Wild
& Scenic Rivers Act protects and that the Park Service relied on in its
decision.
Much of the opposition to the bill focused more on its precedential
value than on bridging the St. Croix River.  According to former Vice Presi-
dent Walter Mondale, the bill “would be a potent precedent” that will be
cited by “a multiple of developers . . . as evidence that our national river
system is open for sale.”92  Senator Klobuchar denied that the bill “creates
some kind of precedent” regarding the Wild & Scenic Rivers Act.  “This is a
very unique situation,” she explained.93  “It has taken us a year to pass.  We
are in a situation where any new bridge would need an exemption to the
Scenic Rivers Act.”94  But the fact that a generally applicable environmental
statute prohibits a specific project hardly renders the St. Croix bridge
unique.  Indeed, a congressional opponent of the bridge said that “it’s hard
to imagine any future bridge project that won’t receive a waiver like this
issued by Congress.”95
A final justification for the bill is that Congress is satisfied with the Wild
& Scenic Rivers Act generally.  The bill’s supporters continually praised the
WSRA and insisted that they were only interested in this one exception.  Only
Kentucky Senator Rand Paul wondered whether the St. Croix controversy
suggested that there was something wrong with the WSRA itself.96  The pro-
cedural meaning is that Congress may find it easier to legislate with respect
to the environmental consequences of specific projects rather than to enact
new, general principles of environmental law.  It was, in other words, easier
for Congress to decide whether there should be a new bridge across the St.
Croix River than it would be for Congress to legislate regarding the criteria
governing new bridges generally.  To be sure, one opponent of the bridge
argued that Congress should have been considering “a long-term, robust sur-
face transportation bill so that we can address the backlog of deficient
bridges, roads, and transit systems in every State across the Nation.”97  But
Congress displayed little inclination to tackle that broader project, while the
resolution of the St. Croix River dispute gained bipartisan support.
92 Id. at 2 (statement of former Vice President Mondale).
93 158 CONG. REC. S33 (daily ed. Jan. 23, 2012) (statement of Sen. Klobuchar).
94 Id.
95 Id. at H1082 (daily ed. Feb. 29, 2012) (statement of Rep. Holt).
96 See Miscellaneous National Parks Bills Hearing, supra note 91, at 15 (statement of Sen.
Paul).
97 158 CONG. REC. H1081 (daily ed. Feb. 29, 2012) (statement of Rep. Rahall).
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B. Designating Wilderness Areas in West Virginia
The provisions of the Wild Monongahela Act appear to offer another
example that satisfies all of the criteria for successful site-specific legislation.
These provisions designated nearly 40,000 acres of Forest Service land in
West Virginia as new and expanded wilderness areas.  The provisions were
the product of extensive community involvement.  The bill’s sponsor, Repre-
sentative Nick Rahall, explained that “we will be judged by future generations
on our stewardship of this land that is West Virginia, and so I believe that it is
of paramount importance that we once again set aside some of God’s handi-
work in our forests by preserving these Federal lands in their pristine state.”98
A local pastor added, “Wilderness teaches humility.  The mountains are big
and we are small.  Surrounded by wildness, we experience God’s immense
creation as majestic yet intricate in its uncountable details.”99  A local mayor,
a labor leader, a business owner, and other West Virginians testified on the
behalf of the bill, explaining that wilderness was special to West Virginia, it
helps tourism, and it is disappearing.  Even Utah’s Rob Bishop, a frequent
opponent of wilderness proposals, praised the fact “that this consensus bill
has bipartisan input,” the locals supported the measure, and their wishes
should be heeded.100  Only Tennessee’s Representative John Duncan voiced
caution, stating that his experience with wilderness designations suggested
that West Virginians might come to rue their support for their new wilder-
ness areas.101
The problem with this blissful picture is that Congress did not enact the
Wild Monongahela provisions as a freestanding bill.  Rather, they were
included along with 175 other site-specific provisions in the Omnibus Public
Lands Management Act of 2009.  That bill combined seventy provisions that
had received congressional hearings with 100 provisions that had not.  The
bill passed the House by a 285-140 vote.  There is no indication that Congress
regretted its decision to enact the Wild Monongahela provisions, but the
enactment process lessens its utility for illustrating an idealized decision to
legislate about the environment of a specific place.
C. Building a Road Through the Izembek National Wildlife Refuge
The 2009 Omnibus Act also contained a site-specific provision that envi-
ronmentalists loathed.  Congress authorized the Secretary of the Interior to
exchange lands within the Izembek National Wildlife Refuge for lands owned
by the State of Alaska and the King Cove Corporation for the purpose of
constructing a single-lane gravel road between the communities of King Cove
98 Wild Monongahela Act: A National Legacy For West Virginia’s Special Places: Hearing on
H.R. 5151 Before the Subcomm. on Nat’l Parks, Forests & Public Lands of the H.R. Comm. on
Natural Resources, 112th Cong. 3 (2008) (statement of Rep. Rahall).
99 Id. at 3 (statement of Rev. Dennis Sparks, Executive Director, West Virginia Council
of Churches).
100 Id. at 34 (statement of Rep. Bishop).
101 See 154 CONG. REC. 6519 (2008) (statement of Rep. Duncan).
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and Cold Bay, Alaska.102  King Cove residents wanted the road in order to
obtain reliable access to and from Cold Bay, which has the area’s only medi-
cal facilities and airport.  But the National Wildlife Refuge Association
(NWRA) objected to the proposed road because it would cross the Izembek
National Wildlife Refuge, including the Izembek Wilderness Area.  The
NWRA worried about the impact of a road on Izembek’s vast bird and wild-
life populations and because “[t]his precedent could open the door for other
destructive practices on wilderness areas.”103  The provision in the 2009
Omnibus Act replaced the dictates of the Wilderness Act and other statutes
and instead asked the Secretary of the Interior to decide only whether the
road is in “the public interest.”
In February 2013, the FWS indicated that the road would not be built.
The FWS released an environmental impact statement that concluded that
the project would cause irreparable environmental harm.104  The final deci-
sion, though, will be made by the new Secretary of the Interior, and Alaska
Senator Lisa Murkowski responded to the FWS’s EIS by suggesting that she
may block President Obama’s nominee to serve as Secretary of the Interior
unless the road is approved.105  According to Murkowski, the public safety
concerns for the residents of King Cove should outweigh the environmental
concerns, whereas the FWS understanding of the “public interest” presumes
that “the public is made up solely of birds and sea otters.”106  Outgoing Sec-
retary of the Interior Ken Salazar acknowledged that “the 2009 Act does not
provide a process for making a public interest determination,” so he agreed
that it is necessary to conduct additional studies of the proposed road’s
impact on public health and native Alaskans.107  This means that the final
decision about the Izembek road will be made by the new Secretary of the
Interior.
102 Omnibus Public Land Management Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-11, Title VI, Subti-
tle E, 123 Stat. 991.
103 National Wildlife Refuge Ass’n, The Road to Nowhere: Gravel Road Full of Potholes for
Wildlife and Taxpayers, at 4, http://www.refugeassociation.org/new-pdf-files/Izembek_
report09.pdf.
104 See U.S. FISH AND WILDLIFE SERV., U.S. FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE ANALYSIS DOES
NOT SUPPORT PROPOSED LAND EXCHANGE AND ROAD CORRIDOR THROUGH IZEMBEK
NATIONAL WILDLIFE REFUGE (Feb. 5, 2013), available at http://izembek.fws.gov/pdf/
izembek_feis_nr.pdf (quoting FWS Director’s Dan Ashe’s statement “that building a road
through the refuge would irretrievably damage the ecological functions of the refuge and
impair its ability to provide vital support for native wildlife”).  For a complete environment
impact statement, see U.S. Fish and Wildlife Serv., Izembek Nat’l Wildlife Refuge, Izembek
National Wildlife Refuge Land Exchange/Road Corridor EIS (Feb. 6, 2013), available at
http://izembek.fws.gov/eis.htm.
105 See Phil Taylor, Murkowski Mulling Hold on Jewel over Alaska Road Decision, ENV’T &
ENERGY DAILY (Feb. 8, 2013), http://www.eenews.net/EEDaily/2013/02/08/1.
106 159 CONG. REC. S495 (daily ed. Feb. 7, 2013) (statement of Sen. Murkowski).
107 Memorandum from Ken Salazar, Secretary of the Interior, to Assistant Secretary –
Indian Affairs Director, U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., Izembek National Wildlife Refuge, Land
Exchange/Road Corridor, at 1 (Mar. 21, 2013).
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CONCLUSION
Site-specific laws are underappreciated.  The understandable impulse to
employ laws of general application should not overshadow the important
role available to laws focusing on particular places.  The ability to tailor statu-
tory commands to the unique needs of unique places counsels in favor of
congressional action, especially when Congress is otherwise deadlocked on
broader changes and when the disputed issue is within the legislative compe-
tence to resolve.  Site-specific laws are not a panacea, but they deserve greater
attention and greater support than they have received so far.
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